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What do we want them to want to do? Against intrinsic motivation
Alexander M. Sidorkin, University of Northern Colorado
ABSTRACT
A significant body of research in psychology demonstrates how extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic
motivation of students. The conceptual weakness of the notion of intrinsic motivation makes the
research findings at least suspect, and for sure excessively generalized. The research is often used to
argue against compensating students for their academic work. It contributed to expansion of false
beliefs about the possibility of significant increase of intrinsic learning motivation. These beliefs are
grounded in several false assumptions:
1. The assumption of abundant curiosity; or a belief that children are all motivated to learn
everything that is offered to them. It is false, because children’s indiscriminate curiosity
inevitably focuses on a more narrow set of interests as the person’s identity develops.
2. The assumption that intrinsic motivation can be easily invoked, drawn to the surface. This
assumption does not find support in experience. Moreover, education is different from
entertainment in terms of objectives, so adding entertainment value to curriculum tends to
diminish its educational value.
3. The main argument against extrinsic rewards is that if those are taken away, activity stops. But
this argument is tautological: the definition of extrinsic rewards is that they create motives
extrinsic to the person’s interest in the activity. The fact that the desired activity stops after
withdrawing the rewards is simply another way of defining what extrinsic motivation is, not an
argument against it.
4. And finally, proponents of intrinsic motivation believe it can be extended to every activity.
However, this is impossible, because having an interest or preference in one activity implies less
interest or preference for another activity. Interest is selective, and is used by people to
establish their identities. Therefore, some children will not like school learning simply because
they are different from those children who do.
The utopian thinking predictably has an effect opposite to its intention, namely, the strengthening of
administrative and legal coercion in education. The solution seems to be to offer a number of extrinsic
rewards for children to motivate their learning, without the fear that it will somehow destroy their
intrinsic love of knowledge. In the near future, we need to rethink schools as places where children
receive something tangible in exchange for their effort in learning the curriculum. For some, it is the
belonging to the school community, for other, an opportunity to engage in activities that are truly

1

desirable (sports or theater, or arts, or social activism). In the long run, we need to figure out a way of
normalizing the educational industry by starting to pay older children salaries for their learning activity.

Research shows…
Alfie Kohn offers an exhaustive and authoritative review of the research findings in Punished by
Rewards.1 Although 15 years old, the book remains an effective summary of the entire field of learning
motivation research. His account is consistent with other reviews.2 This particular research story begins
with a classic 1971 experiment,3 where Edward Deci asked college students to work on a puzzle. Some
were offered money; others were not. When left alone supposedly to wait for the next phase, those
who got paid continued to play with the puzzle less than those who did not get paid. The difference was
at first insignificant, but became stronger in subsequent studies.
Virtually at the same time, Mark Lepper experimented with Head Start preschoolers, who were given
Magic Markers to play with. Some were given a reward for drawing, while others were not. A week or
two weeks later, those who received the reward were less interested in the markers that those who did
not, and less than they were before the rewards.4
A number of other studies followed, producing numerous results mostly consistent with the original
ones. Simplifying a little, I will reduce these results to three points:
1. “Extrinsic rewards reduce intrinsic motivation”5
2. Extrinsic rewards change short‐term behavior, but they do not lead to lasting change. As soon as
the rewards are withdrawn, desired behavior also stops.
3. Rewards negatively affect performance. People who are rewarded do less well on intellectual
tasks; they are less creative, and tend to chose simpler, less challenging tasks.
These findings would remain one of many curiosities produced by psychologists, if they were not used to
inform debates in educational policy. Any time some sort of tangible rewards for learning are suggested,
critics inevitably cite this research. For example, here is how Barry Schwartz responds to the recent New
York City’s plan to offer cash rewards to students for attending schools and doing well on the exams:
But it is plausible that when students get paid to go to class and show up for tests; they
will be even less interested in the work than they would be if no incentives were
present. If that happens, the incentive system will make the learning problem worse in
the long run, even if it improves achievement in the short run — unless we’re prepared
to follow these children through life, giving them a pat on the head, or an M&M or a
check every time they learn something new.6
All attempts to treat school learning as productive work that deserves compensation meet resistance
backed up by research containing one or more of the three claims above. Let us take a critical look at
these findings.

Fallacy 1: Abundant curiosity
Kohn and others assume that students are already abundantly endowed with intrinsic motivation to
learn, and we just fail to channel this motivation properly. Of course, if this is true, the finding #1 would
lead a reasonable teacher to stop giving any sorts of extrinsic rewards, because they only diminish the
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existing pool of intrinsic motivation. However, such an assumption is not based on any evidence or any
strong argument; there is no sign of the large pre‐existing motivation to master K‐12 curriculum, either
currently existing or however revised. Therefore, where no motivation exists in the first place, extrinsic
rewards will produce total gain in motivation, even if they are less effective than intrinsic motivation. To
Kohn’s credit, he understands the objection above; that he avoids answering it is a real pity.
Many educational writers lamented the loss of curiosity among children and attributed it to schooling.
Indeed, little children enter school doors excited and eager to learn, only to become bored and
frustrated a few years later. The facts are indisputable, but the authors succumb to the most trivial
logical fallacy, assuming correlation indicates causation. It is very likely that students change their
attitude towards learning simply because they grow up. A very simple evolutionary argument puts a lot
of doubt into the abundant curiosity assumption. Indiscriminant curiosity is beneficial to a young animal
that has to learn everything about its environment, both natural and social. However, the drive to learn
is an enormous physiological expense, and it would detract an adult animal from more important tasks
of reproduction, nourishment, and avoiding danger. Thus the adult animal naturally becomes more
discriminate, and less curious in its learning; it develops preferences, focuses its attention on specific
things it finds “interesting.” Curriculum is a human way of focusing learning on specific things to the
expense of other, perhaps more interesting things; it is an attempt to counter the natural narrowing and
waning of curiosity.
John Dewey contributed to the myth of abundant curiosity: “Now, keeping in mind these fourfold
interests—the interest in conversation, or communication; in inquiry, or finding out things; in making
things, or construction; and in an artistic expression—we might say they are natural resources, the
uninvested capital upon the exercise of which depends the active growth of the child.”7 I do not wish to
dispute the existence of these natural resources, but the amount can and should be disputed. Dewey
may have overestimated the reserves, but after 100+ years of Progressive experiments in education, we
have a better sense of how much curiosity is available for us to use in education. The failure of
Progressive thought to reshape educational practice can be attributed to many different causes.8
However, one plausible explanation is that the assumption of the boundless curiosity simply turned out
to be wrong.
The image of the boundlessly curious child is a more of an ethical ideal than a result of research. The
claim about damage done by extrinsic rewards does not seem warranted, because it rests on dubious
assumption that children have an inexhaustible willingness to learn anything. While extrinsic rewards
may dampen the pre‐existing intrinsic motivation, it will not damage what did not exist before.
Extrinsically motivated learning activity is better for learning than no learning activity at all.

Fallacy 2: Intrinsic motivation can be easily manufactured
Rejection of extrinsic rewards leaves just one option: to increase intrinsic motivation. Kohn’s book is full
of good research analysis and insightful argument, but the following makes one cringe: “It is often
possible to devise creative, interesting ways of doing things that are of themselves quite dull. A friend of
mine managed the mind‐numbing memorization anatomy required in medical school by inventing
elaborate fables in which different parts and systems of the body played starring roles.”9 This is an
example of the utopian faith in making all learning interesting, or intrinsically motivating; not unlike an
alchemist’s belief in transmutation of common metals into gold. To sustain the legend, there is always a
friend who has done just that, but never a definite proof. Consider, for example, an assessment made by
the already mentioned pioneers of the intrinsic motivation research Mark Lepper:
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Do these sorts of instructionally incidental embellishments actually enhance students’
interest in the activity itself? Somewhat surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence
available to answer this question.10
Tellingly, Kohn spends an entire second half of the book suggesting instructional embellishments to
increase intrinsic motivation. This seems to be odd, because “embellishments” can also be considered
instances of extrinsic motivation. Yet this is what the logic of intrinsic motivation requires; one cannot
simply “find” preexisting intrinsic motives; one has to show a way of creating them. Some of the
embellishments are inspiring, some are banal, and most seem targeting children who are already
motivated. However, the very fact of the overwhelming concern for creating more of intrinsic
motivation contradicts the initial claim that there is plenty of it to go around. If the innate curiosity
would indeed be naturally plentiful, no need for instructional embellishments would ever arise.
Even if intrinsic motivation can be induced, this would not mean that such a task does not have
limitations. If we make the entire curriculum relevant and interesting to students, it will cease to be
curriculum, and will be indistinguishable from entertainment. Entertainment has one purpose: make its
content intrinsically motivating to consume. It does not have a role of selecting and organizing such
content for the purposes other than keeping consumer’s attention. To say that certain content has
educational value is the same as to say that it is preselected on the grounds of usefulness as defined by
others, and not on the grounds of intrinsic appeal. While many progressivists believed children can
select their own curriculum, they actually assumed it would be selected by certain rules. Dewey, for
example, believed we can select curriculum by directing the child’s activities, “giving them exercise
along certain lines.”11 Whatever the method, curriculum without any criteria other than learner’s
interest ceases to be curriculum. Although hybrids do exist, entertainment and education pull in the
opposite directions. None of the edutainment ventures were clearly successful either commercially or
educationally.
While it is possible to induce intrinsic motivation, on a large scale it is an impossible task because of the
limitations outlined above.

Fallacy 3: A is not B, therefore A is better
Another interesting assumption is that the rewards are supposed to be taken away at some point, and
the desired behavior should still continue on its own. Kohn writes: “...it is most important to avoid
rewarding people for engaging in an activity or behavior that we would like them to find intrinsically
motivating… Extrinsic motivators are most dangerous when offered for something we want children to
want to do.”12 Barry Schwartz has the same concern for the future: what if students always expect a
reward for learning something they are not otherwise inclined to learn? This is an example of specifically
educational exceptionalism rooted in sharp distinction between the world of learning and the world of
working. A company that stops paying its employees is not surprised if employees stop working. Why
should it work differently for children is rarely explained, although the assumption is quite clear: Kohn
and many others believe that children should want to learn, and the merit of extrinsic rewards can only
be measured by how much they can help this desire to happen. In a workplace, rewards are to cause
certain behavior; in schools, they are to generate certain “better” motivation for behavior. Such a
striking difference in approach is hard to justify.
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One can see how intrinsic motivation adepts offer a tautological argument: Extrinsic motivation is bad
because it does not lead to intrinsic motivation and any motivation should lead to intrinsic motivation,
because the latter is good. In other words, intrinsic motivation is good because extrinsic is bad.
To be intrinsically motivated essentially means to work for free. We try to convince children that their
work is good for them and intrinsically interesting. However the huge amount of effort, and the scale of
manipulations required to drive these two ideas home are the signs of falsity, not of veracity. That our
success rate is quite low speaks of the same.
Interestingly, Kohn explicitly compares extrinsic rewards used in schools with merit pay systems used at
workplaces. Both do not work, he observes. However, Kohn ignores the fact that students do not get
paid at all; he never implies salaries for adults should be discarded. That would clearly be a utopian
thinking even Communists abandoned at least half a century ago. Employees who feel underpaid
perceive merit pay as a dishonest attempt to wring more productivity out of them without fair
compensation. People who feel fairly compensated perceive merit pay as a management fad, and apply
reasonable effort without merit pay. Merit pay and school rewards have in common their position
outside of normal labor market relationship; those are just attempts to get more labor at a discount by
substituting real money with trinkets, or giving small sums disproportional significance not connected to
their value. Both are just not strong enough to create a real change in labor productivity. Token
economies do not work not because they are economies, but because they are token.

Fallacy 4: Intrinsic motivation can be extended to everything
The finding #3 is not so surprising. People do better if they are under the impression that they do it for
their own interest and enjoinment. However, to assume that people can do everything at the same top
of their shape is unrealistic. It would be the same as to ask a person to love everyone he meets with the
same passion as he loves his special person. But love and friendship are exclusive relationships: we are
close to some people because we are not as close to everyone we now. Similarly, a person will perform
better at some tasks she perceives to be her choice, in part because she will not do as well on other
tasks. A person’s likes and dislikes are selective, which creates and sustains the sense of agency. The
hope to convert all kids into followers of the Love for Knowledge religion is simply utopian, because such
a conversion would obliterate their individuality. Just like some kids make being a good student, or being
interested in learning a part of their identity, others identify with other traits to the exclusion of these.
Students who are invited to play with puzzles for free in Deci’s experiment, are, in effect, asked to
volunteer their time. The activity itself is motivated by notions of altruism, of helping science, of
boredom, of doing a favor to Dr. Deci, of hope to get some useful contacts, of curiosity, and perhaps a
dozen more considerations. The silence about rewards triggers powerful mechanisms of self‐
justification: I am not getting paid therefore this must be interesting; otherwise I am a sucker. Such a
motive is no less extrinsic than desire for money. Those promised money calculate that other probable
payoff is probably going to be minimal. A person paid to do something rents his body and his mind to
the employer; it is in his interest to apply less effort and thus perform less well. Paying someone means
freeing one from obligation; it means using different currency; it is a signal that social approval won’t be
forthcoming. The logic of the gift in the relational economy can be stronger than the logic of markets;
this does not negate that both are somewhat less and more than intrinsic. What psychologists did in
their experiments is silly: why try to incentivize behavior that does not need incentives? No one does
that, so their surprise is hard to understand. Of course, all people, not just children will read the
message: if an activity involves rewards, it must not be that interesting on its own merit. But not just
5

that, the researchers misunderstood the laws of human reciprocity and what they called the intrinsic
motivation.
In the case of magic markers, similar critique applies. I don’t believe kids are born with innate interest in
magic markers. Instead, they learn the difference between bad desires and good desires. Perhaps kids
react to subtle clues about good desires when magic markers are introduced in the classroom. One is
supposed to be interested in them; such desires are approved by the teacher; otherwise, why bring
them in class in the first place? They cannot avoid seeing older kids drawing. But when some of the kids
are given trinkets for playing with magic markers, a not‐so‐subtle cue is that markers should not be
desired on their own merit. The teacher’s actions again speak louder than words: do not be interested in
markers unless I give you a trinket. Do the kids lose intrinsic motive or simply do what is expected of
them, in both cases? Even when left alone, children respond to social approval; they internalize adults’
expectations; isn’t it what makes things “interesting” in the first place?

The motive as a story
The problem is deeper than the flawed conceptual distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation. Let us consider the difference between motive and action. The former is by necessity a
linguistic and social phenomenon; the latter may or may not be so. Motive is, ultimately, a story about
action to which we have access only though language, and it is a story told to someone else. Why people
do certain things is what the person who acts says. We may or may not believe the actor’s version, and
provide an alternative story which is what prosecutors or therapists like to do. However, there is no
access to the motive without language. Moreover, when a prosecutor or a therapist help finding “true”
motives, what does that mean? In judicial proceedings, establishment of a plausible motive contributes
to the proof of guilt, but it does not make a claim of veracity. The claim is limited to plausibility. When a
therapist reveals a true motive that has been previously repressed, she is simply convincing the patient
to accept a different, better story about his actions.13
The story of “why” is always contested and censured; those who receive the message of the motive
allow and disallow certain motives to be named; the community establishes rules of such
communication. The next point is important for my argument: What Kohn and psychologists write about
learning motivation is also a part of the process of censoring. They describe learning motivation in
strikingly judgmental manner: the intrinsic motivation is good and honorable while extrinsic motivation
is base and utilitarian. Psychological research prescribes more than it describes. A psychologist in a very
literal sense creates the motives by describing them, since the motive is a story, and psychologists retell
stories.
The distinction between a motive and an action is a specific case of the more general distinction
between sign and reality. B.F. Skinner and behaviorists after him make a mistake of obliterating any
difference between the two; in his view, language is just another form of behavior. I disagree:
motivation is different from outward action; this distinction is unavoidable in a social world. Neither law
nor ethics are conceivable without differentiating between the intent and the content of human actions.
However, Kohn makes another error by assuming a direct causality: motivation causes behavior.
Therefore, his logic goes, if we ensure good kind of motivation, it will result in the increase of desired
behavior. He overestimates the independence and importance of motivation with respect to action.
Kohn is making an ontological assumption about the existence of motive and action: the motive’s
existence is privileged over that of the action; it pertains to “deeper” more truthful description of the
action than a factual one would be. The cause must precede the effect, but motive both precedes and
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follows the action. We know what we want to do, in part, because we have done it before. The motive is
a result of previous and current behavior. Motivation can be as easily described as a consequence of
action as its cause. We tell a story about our past or future action, and result and outcome of this action
determines what story we tell. For example, I was interested in the puzzle, which is why I played with it.
Or, I played longer with the puzzle because it was interested in it.

Can there be intrinsic motivation?
Pierre Bourdieu attacks the notion of intrinsic motivation in his essay “Is a disinterested Act Possible?”
The answer is this:
All apparently disinterested actions must conceal intentions to maximize a certain kind
of profit. In introducing the notion of symbolic capital (and symbolic profit), we in some
way radicalize the questioning of the naïve version: the most holy actions — asceticism
or the most extreme devotion — may always be suspect (historically they have been,
through certain extreme forms of rigorism) of being inspired by search for the symbolic
profit of saintliness, or celebrity, etc.14
The concept of the disinterested or intrinsically motivated learner is exactly that, a reflection if a certain
form of symbolic capital. Just like saintliness, or like honor, the intrinsic motivation is a social good, and
it is no more intrinsic than money. A student of certain class must be interested in learning for learning’s
sake. This adds to her status and helps maintain important relationships with others. Dewey expressed a
similar idea: Children “are interested in the world of things mainly in its connection with people, as a
background and medium of human concerns.”15
But let us follow Bourdieu a little further:
In fact, there exist social universes in which the search for strictly economic profit can be
discouraged by explicit norms or tacit injunctions…. The behaviors of honor in
aristocratic or precapitalist societies have at their origin an economy of symbolic goods
based on collective repression of interest and, more broadly, the truth of production
and circulation, which tends to produce “disinterested” habitus, anti‐economic habitus,
disposed to repress interests, in the narrow sense of the term (that is, the pursuit of
economic profits), especially in domestic relations.16
Extrinsic motivation in learning has certainly been repressed through a variety of cultural mechanisms,
including psychological research. Paradoxically, we are witnessing an era of expansion and erosion of
one particular habitus, the habitus of disinterested education. The dramatic expansion of compulsory
education over the last 100 years has created two problems for this habitus. The first is the clash with
the culture of the lower classes which was traditionally not a part of it. “The indifferent person, — writes
Bourdieu, — ‘does not see why they are playing,’ it’s all the same to them; they are in a position of
Buridan’s ass, not making a distinction.”17 Despite tremendous efforts to change it, many lower class
children still refuse to see the rules of the game where the intrinsic learning motivation is a valuable
asset. The second problem is that value of the symbolic capital is eroding, and the habitus of the
disinterested learning is eroding with it. The Human Capital theory argument (more education means
higher earnings) destroys the disinterested learning ideal. You cannot argue that learning is a joy in
itself, and, by the way, it will make you economically successful. Those two messages are contradictory,
and each weakens the other. The spread of purely monetary argument for education is the evidence of
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capitalist habitus encroaching on the pre‐capitalist world of education. What is happening to the field of
education is similar to the decay of the noble society.
In a well‐constituted society of honor, La Rochefoucauld’s analyses are incorrect; they
apply to societies of honor which are already in crisis… , and where the values of honor
crumble as monetary exchanges, and through them the spirit of calculation, are
generalized; this process goes hand in hand with the objective possibility of calculating
(the work and value of a man begin to be evaluated in monetary terms, which is
unthinkable).18
Similarly, the very possibility of calculating the return on educational investment in monetary terms
tends to signify but also to enhance the decay of the intrinsic motivation habitus.

The consequences
Most people have difficulty comprehending even a possibility that there might never be enough
motivation to sustain a universal schooling for 13 years. As Bourdieu puts it, “Between agents and the
social world there is a relationship of infraconscious, infralinguistic complicity: in their practice agents
constantly engage in theses which are not posed as such.”19 The real thesis is that kids should go to
school and learn without demanding any compensation. However the stated thesis is that all kids are
curious and that extrinsic rewards are only harming their innate thirst for knowledge. The habitus of
schooling rests on the denial of certain truths: specifically on denial of the shortage of intrinsic
motivation. The production of intrinsic motivation depends entirely on such denial: If we stop believing
that all kids want to learn, we will undermine whatever limited amounts of intrinsic motivation do exist.
This is why it is so difficult to argue against the prevalence of intrinsic motivation position: the society
has a stake in maintaining the myth.
Yet no amount of denial will be able to manufacture the needed quantities and duration of motivation,
considering that the economy becomes more and more knowledge‐based. We depend on very large
proportion of population having school‐learned skills, and the demand does not seem to subside.
Education experiences a classic case of shortage of labor. It is finally becoming like any other part of the
economy: if we do not have enough volunteers to do demanding and boring jobs, we find ways of
compensating someone for doing such jobs. Yet as long as the myth holds, educators blindly believe the
myth of intrinsic motivation, instead of experimenting with various forms of compensation. Learning
motivation does not have a pedagogical solution; it is an economic problem.
The assumption about primacy of intrinsic motivation is not a harmless mistake. As it happens with
many utopias, once it fails, brutal force fills the void. Compulsory education system has been expanding
under the utterly unrealistic assumptions that all children can be made interested in learning. When it
does not happen, we blame teachers, parents, families, policymakers, tests, and everyone else.
However, to maintain the semblance of order and to show some achievement, schools have no choice
but to introduce stricter rules, bring more policy, and more administrative enforcement in school
buildings. As schooling expands into the lower classes, it takes on more and more prison‐like features.
This is the case, in part, because the society is not ready to accept what it should accept: schooling
expanded to such a degree that it no longer may be sustained by the limited resources of intrinsic
motivation.
The solution seems to be to offer a number of extrinsic rewards for children to motivate their learning,
without the fear that it will somehow destroy their intrinsic love of knowledge. In the near future, we
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need to rethink schools as places where children receive something tangible in exchange for their effort
in learning the curriculum. For some, it is the belonging to the school community, for other, an
opportunity to engage in activities that are truly desirable (sports or theater, or arts, or social activism).
In the long run, we need to figure out a way of normalizing the educational industry by starting to pay
older children salaries for their learning activity.
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